



Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council of 31 October 2001 (S/PRST/2001/30), in which the Council requested me to submit quarterly reports on the situation in Somalia. The report covers major developments in the country since my previous report (S/2007/658). It provides an update on the security, human rights and humanitarian situations and further outlines development activities carried out by the United Nations agencies and programmes for Somalia as well as the status of contingency planning for the possible deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation to take over from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1772 (2007) and its presidential statement of 19 December 2007 (S/PRST/2007/49).

II. Main developments in Somalia

A. Political developments

2. Since my previous report, significant developments have taken place in Somalia leading to the formation of a new government and its relocation from Baidoa to the capital, Mogadishu.

3. Following a political crisis within the transitional federal institutions resulting in the resignation of the Prime Minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, President Abdullahi Yusuf engaged in consultations with various leaders, including parliamentarians, with a view to amending the Transitional Federal Charter to allow non-parliamentarians to be appointed as ministers. These efforts, in line with recommendations made by the National Reconciliation Congress, bore tangible results. On 7 November, members of Parliament in Baidoa unanimously voted in favour of amending article 47 of the Transitional Federal Charter. This provided an opportunity for President Yusuf to appoint a non-parliamentarian as Prime Minister.

4. On 22 November, Nur Hassan Hussein was appointed Prime Minister. On 2 December, in an effort to establish a government of national unity, Prime Minister Hussein appointed a Cabinet of 73 members, including 31 Ministers, 31 Deputy Ministers and 11 State Ministers. Only three Ministers were non-parliamentarians, namely the Ministers in charge of foreign affairs and information and a Deputy



Minister. Soon after their nominations, four ministers resigned from their positions in protest at what they perceived to be a lack of broad consultation on the nomination of Cabinet members. Other Ministers followed suit, complaining that their clans were insufficiently represented. In addition, criticism emerged from a cross section of Somali communities and from various representatives of the international community who viewed the new Government as unwieldy and without focus.

5. The composition of the new Cabinet was in line with the 4:5 power-sharing formula provided for in the Transitional Federal Charter. However, it was observed that it failed to take into consideration the recommendation of the National Reconciliation Congress advocating the formation of an efficient government chosen from within and outside Parliament, giving full consideration to qualifications, efficiency, experience and transparency. The Somali public viewed the nomination process as one that was not transparent and saw the lack of qualified ministers and the absence of representatives of civil society and the opposition as a key weakness. Opening up the cabinet to non-parliamentarians was intended to improve the efficiency of the Transitional Federal Government, enhancing its capacity to deliver for the remaining period of the transition and promoting reconciliation.

6. Following growing criticism from within and outside Somalia, Prime Minister Hussein, in consultation with President Yusuf, appointed a streamlined government largely composed of competent professionals as recommended by the National Reconciliation Congress. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and its international partners, including the European Union, warmly welcomed the Transitional Federal Parliament's vote of confidence in the new Cabinet and expressed satisfaction with the Prime Minister's commitment to serve all Somalis.

7. On 6 January, Prime Minister Hussein announced the appointment of a new Cabinet comprising 18 Ministers and 5 Deputy Ministers. Of the 18 ministerial posts, three have yet to be filled. The Prime Minister has indicated that he will consult with a number of key actors before he completes the nomination process. Among the 18 Ministers, nine were selected from within Parliament. A decision was made to select the other nine Ministers from outside Parliament; six have already been appointed and the remaining three positions, to be nominated at a later stage, are left to the opposition in exile.

8. Since assuming office, the Prime Minister has shown a commitment to effectively engage with all Somalis irrespective of their political affiliations. On 5 December, at a meeting convened in Addis Ababa by the United States Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, he reiterated the readiness of his Government to reach out to all Somalis who want to participate in a peaceful transition to a democratic regime. The appointment of the new Prime Minister is a renewed opportunity to make further progress in the reconciliation process and to successfully complete the remainder of the transition period.

9. Throughout the reporting period, my Special Representative, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, kept in close contact with the leaders of the Transitional Federal Government as well as representatives of business and civil society, encouraging them to reach out to opposition groups. On 17 December he proposed options to the Security Council to address the political and security challenges and called on the

international community to commit itself to a comprehensive and pragmatic course of action in support of Somalis.

10. In a bold move showing commitment to stabilizing the country, the Government relocated to Mogadishu on 20 January. Following the move to the capital, the Prime Minister also made public statements on his Government's willingness to restore security, uphold the freedom of the press and promote national reconciliation.

11. On 10 January, Parliament endorsed the Cabinet and its proposed programme of work. The programme focuses on the following priority areas: reconciliation; peace and security; strengthening institutions; the constitution; and electoral issues.

12. The Government plans to extend the reconciliation process to the grass-roots as a follow-up to the National Reconciliation Congress. It also aims to initiate dialogue with members of the opposition within and outside Somalia. The Government proposes to make every effort to achieve full reconciliation and has therefore appealed to Somali civil society, religious leaders, the business community and women and youth groups to participate in the reconciliation process.

13. Given the inadequate capacity of security institutions, the Government proposes to build Somali security and police forces that are able to ensure the safety and protection of the citizens. The Transitional Federal Government plans to train its security forces on protection of civilians, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and to build Government capacity to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance.

14. The new Executive is also looking forward to strengthening the capacity of government institutions entrusted with the task of managing and controlling public finances such as the Central Bank, the office of the Auditor General and the Accountant General.

15. On constitutional and electoral issues, the vision of the Government is to establish a Somali State, with functional governance institutions as well as a multiparty system. Before the end of the transition period, the Government intends to enact an electoral bill, set up a national census commission, establish a national electoral commission and, finally, enact a public bill regulating the formation and registration of political parties. A national commission for the delimitation of regional, State and district boundaries will also be established. A process will be initiated to appeal to the international community for the technical and financial support required for the referendum to be held in 2009.

16. During the reporting period, my Special Representative has focused his efforts on building greater cohesion among members of the international community involved in Somalia. All have expressed support for the leadership of UNPOS. The European Union and other international partners, together with the United Nations country team and UNPOS, have intensified their efforts to strengthen coordination for international assistance to the Transitional Federal Government. A six-month start-up package worth \$14 million has been developed to strengthen the transitional federal institutions.

17. On 19 January 2008, the African Union Peace and Security Council met in Addis Ababa and extended the mandate of AMISOM for another six months, and called on the larger international community to provide adequate support to enhance

the capacity of Somali institutions, including the Transitional Federal Government and its security and defence forces.

B. Security situation

18. In the assessment of the fact-finding mission led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (see section D below), the security situation remains volatile throughout the country, despite significant regional variations, the north being relatively more stable than southern and central Somalia. Given the limited capacity of the Transitional Federal Government to govern and enforce the law, criminal elements engage in a range of unlawful activities, from trafficking in human beings, weapons and drugs to unauthorized collection of taxes and levies and abduction, kidnapping and extortion.

19. More specifically, in the north, the border dispute between “Somaliland” and “Puntland” remains a key security concern, aggravated by kidnappings and acts of piracy, especially in “Puntland”. In southern and central Somalia, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and other anti-Government elements continue to conduct frequent insurgency operations in Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Jawhar, Beledweyne, Baidoa and Galkayo, among other places, targeting mainly the Ethiopian Armed Forces and the forces of the Transitional Federal Government, police stations and Government authorities.

20. There are indications that international terrorists have sought safe haven in the Hiraan and Juba districts, considered to be the stronghold of UIC extremist elements. Since the last quarter of 2007, the security situation in Mogadishu has been characterized by coordinated attacks by anti-Government elements and an increase in Ethiopian Army and Transitional Federal Government operations to eradicate those elements from the area. The use of field guns and mortars in heavily populated zones has reportedly led to considerable loss of life, property damage and massive displacement, AMISOM and the United Nations have occasionally been targeted by the insurgents. Ongoing efforts by the Transitional Federal Government to reach out to the opposition have met some success, but the security situation in Somalia continues to be precarious.

21. Since 1991, the conflict in Somalia has caused thousands of refugees to flee to neighbouring countries, including Kenya, Yemen, Djibouti and Ethiopia, and created diaspora groups in a number of countries. Reports indicate that some regional States and diaspora groups have influence over and have supported various elements within Somalia, making the conflict more difficult to resolve.

22. The security situation in Somalia is further complicated by regional and international factors, including the proliferation of arms, the potential use of Somalia as a stage for a proxy war among neighbours and the continuing threat of piracy, which adversely affects the delivery of humanitarian supplies. While reports of international terrorist cells in Somalia could not be confirmed, radical elements have used sophisticated remote-controlled explosive devices and suicide bombs in several parts of the country. A number of interlocutors expressed concern to the fact-finding mission that the longer law and order is absent from Somalia, the greater the chance that international terrorists will use its territory as a safe haven, creating significant regional and international threats to peace and security.

C. African Union Mission in Somalia

23. Since my last report, the most significant development in AMISOM has been the deployment of an 850-strong Burundian battalion in Mogadishu. The last batch arrived on 20 January 2008. The strength of AMISOM now stands at 2,613 men. Discussions with regard to the deployment of troops from Nigeria and Ghana later in the year continue. The AMISOM force continues to provide security and conduct patrols for the protection of the airport and seaport as well as the presidential palace.

24. The African Union continues to face serious constraints, particularly with regard to finance, logistics and force generation, which need to be resolved if it is to achieve the target of the authorized 8,000 troops needed to implement the AMISOM mandate.

25. The Government of Sweden has pledged to provide the mission with a level-II hospital, which represents a significant enhancement; when completed, the facility will improve health delivery not only for AMISOM but also for the United Nations agencies and local staff operating in Somalia. Other financial support has come from the European Union, China, the League of Arab States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

26. The United States of America continues to support the Ugandan contingent on a bilateral basis. The United States and NATO have pledged to provide airlift facilities to troop-contributing countries while Nigeria has pledged a contribution of US\$ 2 million. These pledges, though welcome, fall short of projected requirements.

27. The United Nations has deployed a team of military and civilian experts at the Headquarters of the African Union to augment AMISOM planning and implementation capacity. In addition, a fact-finding mission visited the region from 7 to 25 January to discuss with the African Union Commission what further support might be provided to AMISOM.

28. With financial support from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AMISOM organized a workshop in November and December 2007 to identify areas of synergy and collaboration between AMISOM and other actors in Somalia, to support AMISOM planning capability and to improve coordination between the various parties. One of its recommendations was the establishment of a working group to review the AMISOM mandate with a view to enhancing its role in protecting and promoting human rights, and strengthening the political engagement in Somalia to support the reconciliation process. A final workshop to design a framework for integrated planning interventions was held from 11 to 15 December.

29. On 20 February 2008, I received a letter from the Chairperson of the African Union, Alpha Oumar Konaré, requesting that the United Nations put in place a financial, logistical and technical support package for AMISOM, totalling some \$817,500,000. A copy of the letter is attached (annex I). The Secretariat is reviewing this request to see how best the United Nations could respond to it. In the meantime, I encourage Member States to provide additional support to the African Union and to troop-contributing countries of AMISOM.

D. Other developments

30. During the period under review, two missions were undertaken, one led by the Department of Political Affairs and the other by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

31. An inter-agency team led by the Department of Political Affairs undertook a strategic assessment with the aim of developing a coherent United Nations strategy for Somalia. The assessment reflects a shared understanding of the causes and consequences of the conflict, identifies priority actions to bring about peace, and puts forward recommendations for an integrated and coherent United Nations strategy on Somalia. The findings of the strategic assessment are attached as annex II.

32. In accordance with the presidential statement of 19 December 2007 (S/PRST/2007/49) and resolution 1772 (2007), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations led an interdepartmental fact-finding mission to the region from 7 to 25 January 2007 to consult stakeholders and assess the security situation on the ground, with a view to updating existing contingency plans and to provide recommendations for further support the United Nations could provide to the AMISOM. The findings of the fact-finding mission are attached as annex III.

33. The mission consulted the African Union in Addis Ababa, met with the combined joint task force for the Horn of Africa and the French forces stationed in Djibouti, and visited several areas in Somalia, including Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baledogle, Marka and Baidoa, where it held discussions with officials of the Transitional Federal Government. In Mogadishu, the team met with the Prime Minister and some members of his Cabinet. The team also met the Mayor of Mogadishu, the Police Commissioner and the Head of the National Security Council, as well as the Force Commander and key staff of AMISOM.

34. These two missions were complementary: the strategic assessment team sought to establish a broader strategic perspective on the basis of inputs from all parts of the United Nations system, while the fact-finding mission focused on contingency plans for the possible deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The strategic assessment highlights the opportunities for enhanced engagement and outlines the approach to use such opportunities to maximum effect, while the report of the fact-finding mission examines in great detail the prevailing security challenges and presents security options to help facilitate a political process. Taken together, the two documents offer a basis for the formulation of a comprehensive United Nations strategy for peace and stability in Somalia.

35. In developing such a strategy, our key concern will be to carefully align and integrate the political, security and programmatic (humanitarian, recovery and development) dimensions of the Organization's efforts in the country, in a well-sequenced and mutually reinforcing fashion. Thus, the political track will aggressively promote and facilitate a constructive political dialogue, building on, and strengthening, the emerging political will for peace among key Somali actors. The withdrawal of foreign forces and a possible review of the transition timeline are among the items to be discussed. The security track will pursue three key objectives, namely, to facilitate the relocation of the UNPOS and United Nations country team headquarters from Nairobi to southern and central Somalia; measures to allow the withdrawal of foreign forces while preventing a security vacuum; and the

development of Somali security capabilities. With progress in the political and security tracks, access and other conditions will improve for the delivery of humanitarian, recovery and development activities. Effective delivery on the programmatic track will, in turn, reinforce our work on the political and security spheres.

Contingency planning for a United Nations integrated peacekeeping mission in Somalia

36. The fact-finding mission led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has developed four scenarios leading up to the deployment of a possible United Nations peacekeeping operation. The scenarios may in fact occur sequentially. The first scenario represents the current situation in which the Transitional Federal Government continues its efforts to engage the opposition in political dialogue, the security situation remains fragile and AMISOM strength does not significantly increase. In the second scenario, political dialogue is initiated with the support of 60 to 70 per cent of Somali actors and security arrangements are made that make a stronger United Nations presence in Mogadishu possible. The third scenario envisages the implementation of a code of conduct on the use of arms among the major factions and agreement on a gradual withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. In the fourth scenario, political and security agreements are consolidated, including a clear statement of support for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Ethiopian forces would have withdrawn.

Contingency plans

37. Under scenario 1, the plan would be to facilitate United Nations political and programmatic (humanitarian, recovery and development) support to Somalia by ensuring a substantial relocation of United Nations staff from Nairobi to Somalia. In response to this scenario, I have requested the Department of Safety and Security to develop viable options to meet this objective. In addition, the Security Council could consider the establishment of a maritime task force formalizing the unilateral initiatives currently being undertaken by individual Member States.

38. Under scenario 2, the intention is to relocate UNPOS headquarters to Mogadishu to strengthen United Nations political support to the peace process. This would require appropriate security arrangements, both in terms of protection of personnel and physical infrastructure to support mediation efforts with Somali actors.

39. Under scenario 3, following a broad-based political agreement, an impartial stabilization force would be deployed to allow the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, prevent a security vacuum and provide impetus to the political dialogue. An estimated 8,000 troops would be required together with police officers.

40. Under scenario 4, a United Nations peacekeeping operation for Somalia would be deployed, provided that broad-based political and security agreements are in place. Prior to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, political agreements reached and security commitments made should include general provisions on power-sharing, the laying-down of arms, respect for human rights, facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the development of governing institutions. A total force of from 15 to 21 infantry battalions would be required. The

total number of United Nations military could number up to 27,000, with a possible police component of up to 1,500 police officers.

III. Activities of the United Nations and the international community

41. On the political front, the agenda proposed by my Special Representative for the stabilization of Somalia and the appointment of a government of consensus has created optimism and momentum in Somalia for the international community to work together to support the country. In this regard, both the Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia welcomed the plan presented by my Special Representative to the Security Council on 17 December and have committed themselves to engage in dialogue.

42. UNPOS continues to consult with leaders of the Transitional Federal Government on its proposals to engage with designated members of the opposition to prepare the ground for high-level meetings. UNPOS organized separate meetings in Pretoria with representatives of the Transitional Federal Government and a delegation of the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia. Furthermore, on 10 January my Special Representative travelled to Asmara to meet with the leadership of the Alliance. During the full and frank discussions the leaders of the Alliance expressed their support for an approach which addressed the grievances of the parties to the conflict in Somalia.

43. On 28 and 29 January 2008, my Special Representative organized a meeting at Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, with Somali and foreign business people. The meeting discussed the current economic situation in the country and encouraged the business community to be involved in the promotion of stability and reconciliation in Somalia.

44. As a follow-up to the briefing by my Special Representative to the Security Council on 17 December 2007, a meeting on security challenges and options for Somalia was held in London on 9 January 2008, facilitated by the Government of the United Kingdom. The meeting brought together foreign policy and security experts from permanent members of the Security Council as well as representatives of the United Nations Secretariat. The options considered by the meeting included (a) the strengthening of AMISOM; (b) the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force; (c) the possible deployment of a multinational force as a bridging mechanism between the existing situation and a United Nations peacekeeping mission; and (d) a political settlement without the need to deploy an international force.

45. The international community continues to actively support the leadership of my Special Representative. In a joint statement issued on 19 December 2007, the European Union High Representative, Javier Solana, and the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Louis Michel, expressed their readiness to support my Special Representative in facilitating an inclusive reconciliation process.

46. Under the auspices of the Coordination Support Group, international partners, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Commission, France and Italy, met with Somali counterparts in November 2007 in northern Somalia. The

group held discussions on the five-year \$2.2 billion Somali reconstruction and development programme. Final consultations with the Transitional Federal Government are to be held in the first quarter of 2008. In addition, the United Nations country team has finalized annual workplans in consultation with Somali counterparts in support of recovery, reconstruction and development programmes. As a next step, the United Nations will discuss with its international partners how best to support aid coordination and management in Somalia.

IV. Humanitarian situation

47. Nearly 300,000 people have left the capital since the end of October 2007 following an upsurge of fighting between the Transitional Federal Government and anti-Government elements. In total, the United Nations estimates that 700,000 people were displaced from Mogadishu and its environs during 2007. The vast majority of them are fleeing from the “war zone” in the capital to the “hunger zone” in the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions, which continue to suffer from crop failure, erratic rainfall, record high food prices and malnutrition levels at or above the emergency threshold of 15 per cent.

48. The delivery of humanitarian assistance is equally confronted with severe access and operational challenges: humanitarian workers are regularly subjected to ad hoc taxation at checkpoints and security incidents during distributions. The number of roadblocks significantly increased during the last quarter, with a total of 336 roadblocks countrywide reported by the United Nations. In November, non-governmental organizations reported forced payments of up to US\$ 475 at eight roadblocks spread along the Mogadishu-Afgooye road — a major area of humanitarian operations. Piracy and hijacking of humanitarian aid have also hindered the provision of assistance.

49. The humanitarian community is actively working to strengthen and improve its cooperation with the Somali authorities. The Prime Minister has expressed his commitment to working closely with humanitarian partners to address the humanitarian crisis.

50. A major relief effort continues in one of the key centres of the crisis along the Mogadishu-Afgooye corridor, where 200,000 internally displaced persons are staying. This includes food distribution, emergency trucking of more than 2 million litres of clean water per day, construction of thousands of latrines, vaccination campaigns and the setting-up of schools in tents for emergency education. Despite a limited number of local partners, activities continue in Mogadishu. More than 50,000 meals are served daily to the vulnerable and urban poor through a prepared meals programme organized by the World Food Programme (WFP). Support is also provided to hospitals, and for the distribution of basic non-food items in settlements of displaced persons, rehabilitation of settlements damaged during the conflict and income-generation projects such as garbage collection.

51. The lack of access to many areas where internally displaced persons have found refuge has hampered the ability to collect adequate and reliable information on numbers and locations and the capacity to assess, monitor and review the situation on the ground. In order to address the situation, the United Nations country team and its partners have promoted the implementation of joint field assessments as well as the introduction of an inter-agency tracking system for non-food items

which includes information on distribution per location, items in the pipeline and plans for procurement.

52. With regard to funding for humanitarian programmes, the United Nations agencies ended the year with the 2007 consolidated appeal process for Somalia at 80 per cent funded, with more than \$306 million received of the \$383 million required. In addition, the humanitarian response greatly benefited from the use of pooled funds put at the disposal of the humanitarian community in Somalia.

53. By the end of 2007, the Humanitarian Response Fund had allocated more than \$10.1 million to 63 projects, half of which were to be implemented by local Somali non-governmental organizations directly or in partnership with international organizations. Some \$15.6 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund were allocated to Somalia in 2007, mainly to provide urgent life-saving interventions in the areas of water, sanitation, nutrition, health and logistics for the internally displaced persons.

54. The 2008 consolidated appeal for Somalia, which was launched in December 2007, seeks to provide urgent assistance and protection to some 1.5 million people, including the more than 600,000 people displaced from Mogadishu in 2007 as estimated by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. It is reported that more than 400 people were consulted during the appeal planning process, including regional and federal authorities, 30 international non-governmental organizations, United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and more than 20 national non-governmental organizations. The 2008 appeal requests some \$406 million for 155 projects from 13 United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, 28 international non-governmental organizations (including the Red Cross/Crescent Movement) and 21 local non-governmental organizations. Of this total, \$26.5 million is already available for proposed projects, leaving an outstanding requirement of nearly \$380 million. This funding is integral to the efforts by United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to enhance their presence to ensure closer proximity to the people in need of assistance and protection.

V. Human rights and protection

55. Violations of human rights and international humanitarian law continue unabated in Mogadishu. Civilians bear the brunt of indiscriminate shelling and shootings. For example, on 9 November, about 75 people died and 200 were reportedly wounded following heavy fighting. Members of civil society, particularly journalists and human rights activists, have been targeted for abuse and persecution. Public servants are also targets of political assassination.

56. Threats to independent media and journalists based in Somalia have increased. In 2007, eight journalists were killed in southern and central Somalia and 47 media professionals were reportedly arrested in the course of their work. A significant number of journalists have been arbitrarily detained and media outlets are intermittently shut down for allegedly disseminating false and hostile information against the Transitional Government. New regulations were enacted preventing independent media from reporting military operations conducted by the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces.

57. Human rights monitors and organizations have very limited capacity to operate. In addition, they are confronted by threats and intimidation from the authorities, and access to independent information for the purposes of monitoring is therefore hampered.

58. To escape conflict, poverty and recurrent drought conditions an increasing number of Somalis continue to risk their lives by undertaking the dangerous journey across the Gulf of Aden. The humanitarian community is working together to respond to the protection issues emerging from the mixed migration movement through Somalia, including a broad dissemination campaign on the perils of the journey. A mixed migration task force created early in 2007, comprising the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Danish Refugee Council and the Norwegian Refugee Council, has been actively working on the development of a rights-based inter-agency framework to respond to the protection and humanitarian needs of vulnerable groups within the migration flow through Somalia.

59. Community mobilization for child protection and family tracing activities continued among internally displaced populations, focusing on the protection challenges that have been exacerbated by the displacement, such as sexual violence and child recruitment.

VI. Operational activities to support peace

Health, child survival, maternal and child health

60. The World Health Organization (WHO) continues to provide trauma care medicines and supplies for the major hospitals in Mogadishu, Galkayo, Baidoa, Kismaayo and Beledweyne and support to mobile health clinics in remote areas to ensure that basic health care services are provided to the affected population, including the most vulnerable groups, children, women and young girls. Together with the United Nations Population Fund, training of midwives in Hargeysa and Boosaaso has also commenced.

61. Accelerated young child survival activities late in 2007 greatly strengthened the ability of the United Nations to address some of the most common causes of child mortality and morbidity in Somalia, most notably through immunization campaigns supported by UNICEF and WHO. During the reporting period, UNICEF supported a measles campaign that provided 70,632 children aged from 9 months to 5 years with protection from measles. This effort was part of a final phase of the measles campaign which reached a total of 450,000 children in 11 districts of south-central Somalia by the end of October 2007. The successful vaccination campaigns led to a decrease in reported measles cases from 3,836 to 564 cases in one year, only seven deaths being reported for the first half of 2007. By December 2007, over 80,000 acutely malnourished children had benefited from UNICEF-supported programmes in south-central Somalia.

Safe water, sanitation and hygiene education

62. UNICEF has increased the scale of its ongoing interventions, including chlorination of wells, garbage collection and health education campaigns to ensure that sanitation needs are met. An outbreak of acute watery diarrhoea in October 2007 was successfully contained in the south-central zone by means of surveillance and case management by WHO and its partners. Considering current access constraints, this is a significant achievement.

Education

63. UNICEF supported the installation of 270 tented schools and the provision of basic teaching/learning materials, enabling 32,400 displaced children to receive primary education. By the end of the school year 2006/07, efforts by UNICEF, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and WFP led to an increase in primary school enrolment of 63,000 students over the school year 2005/06, 60 per cent of them girls.

Livelihoods and food security

64. Important efforts by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), WFP and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), together with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), in the rehabilitation of canals and irrigation systems have helped to prevent flooding in Somalia. FAO has expanded its livelihoods support by providing 6,000 farmers with access to improved production practices in irrigation water usage management and crop diversification and delivering 360,000 treatments for 247,000 animals from 5,700 households in southern and central Somalia. In addition, 200 rural women benefited from credit assistance from UNOPS/IFAD, while 3,681 Somalis participated in the labour-intensive work programme of the International Labour Organization, earning \$537,444 collectively. Such efforts have made significant improvements in the lives of the poorest Somalis.

Shelter

65. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) increased efforts in the last quarter of 2007 towards implementing the joint United Nations/internally displaced person strategy by providing support to cover emergency shelter needs in south-central Somalia, while upgrading conditions in temporary settlements. In "Puntland", UNHCR and UN-Habitat have focused on upgrading temporary settlements as well as on improving durable shelter solutions. Under the UN-Habitat Somalia Urban Development Programme, three shelter construction projects for internally displaced persons and returnees were completed in Hargeysa, Boosaaso and Garoowe with a total of 470 new housing units and additional community infrastructure. In addition, 204 reconstructed houses were handed over to the tsunami-affected community of Xaafuun in "Puntland".

Security and rule of law

66. The efforts of UNDP are directed at strengthening the rule of law and security through support for the police and the judiciary. Some 600 police officers —

including 50 women — graduated from UNDP-supported training at Armo police academy in September. A total of 2,963 police personnel have now been trained with UNDP support over the past two years. Police advisory committees continued their work in Mogadishu, with roll-out plans across Somalia for 2008. More than 400 judicial personnel and custodial corps also received training. Legal aid provision was expanded in “Somaliland”, remand cases in Hargeysa fell by 50 per cent and detainee numbers in police stations fell as a result of legal adviser visits. Support for law faculty staff in Hargeysa continued, and 27 scholarships were provided for female law students. Three legal aid centres were established in “Puntland”. UNDP provided support to the Transitional Federal Government’s Demilitarization Commission.

Governance and public administration

67. Following the appointment of the new Cabinet, UNDP participated in discussions with various partners to define the immediate and longer-term requirements. Activities are under way for the provision of institutional support and facilitation of a planning exercise to design government structures, and the provision of a minimum package of support to enable ministries and other key institutions to perform their duties.

68. Continued technical assistance is provided to key offices and ministries of the Transitional Federal Government and the “Puntland” and “Somaliland” administrations. As part of the re-establishment of regional administrations following local reconciliation, four district councils were established in the Gedo region. UNDP provided training on basic local governance skills through the Ministry of the Interior in five districts in Bakool region and supported training of trainers who will facilitate local council training in the Gedo, Middle Shabelle and Hiraa regions.

69. The constitutional process has been reinvigorated. UNDP, in close collaboration with UNPOS, is leading a consortium of international partners in supporting the process. UNDP has deployed personnel to support the Independent Federal Constitutional Commission and the newly appointed Minister of Regional Development, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation.

70. UN-Habitat has continued its work in the public administration sector. Participatory district profiles were made for all districts in Mogadishu, followed by district consultations in nine districts to set priorities for the rehabilitation of community infrastructure. An urban planning strategy for Hargeysa was published in November 2007 in anticipation of the comprehensive Urban Planning Manual that will be completed by March 2008. Capacities have been built within municipal authorities to use GIS-based property surveys and urban information systems as a tool for planning and improved taxation systems. During the reporting period, the system for Berbera was completed, while implementation of the automated tax billing system continued in Hargeysa and Boorama.

HIV/AIDS and gender-based violence

71. The Transitional Federal Government, “Somaliland” and “Puntland” continue to work together on the Somali AIDS response. The response is on target to meet nationally and globally agreed universal access targets on integrated prevention, treatment care and support for all Somalis. In January, a joint delegation led by the

Transitional Federal Government Ministry of Health and UNAIDS together with the Executive Directors of the “Somaliland”, “Puntland” and south-central AIDS Commissions attended a meeting organized by the World Bank and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Kampala to develop a regional strategy to fight AIDS.

72. The United Nations Population Fund launched an advocacy campaign in “Somaliland” in the light of the “Sixteen Days of activism against gender-based violence”. The campaign has symbolically linked the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, observed on 25 November, and Human Rights Day, observed on 10 December, to remind all of the daily violations of the human rights of women.

VII. Observations

73. Recent developments in Somalia indicate that the political situation in the country provides a unique opportunity for proactive engagement by the international community to support domestic initiatives. However, at the same time the security situation reflected in the report of the fact-finding mission remains a major concern, as does the dire humanitarian condition of the Somali people.

74. The appointment by President Yusuf of Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein and the subsequent selection of an able and competent Cabinet is encouraging. During his briefing to the Council, my Special Representative outlined a dynamic action plan. Council members and the broader international community expressed their full support to my Special Representative, inviting him to play a leading role in coordinating international efforts in support of Somalia.

75. The concurrent strategic assessment and fact-finding missions have shown that despite the difficult security situation characterized by indiscriminate killing, kidnapping and hijacking, there is an opportunity to end the prolonged conflict in Somalia and the suffering of its people. It is possible for us to engage on the ground with the parties to the conflict in a comprehensive manner — addressing the political, security and programmatic dimensions. In this respect, I support the efforts of President Yusuf and Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein to reach out to opposition groups.

76. I reiterate my call for the leaders of the Transitional Federal Government to implement the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Congress of 2007. This includes the development of a road map for the completion of the tasks provided for in the Transitional Federal Charter, particularly the establishment of a functional local administration, the constitutional process, preparation for a national census and the holding of elections scheduled for 2009, as well as the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan.

77. I condemn all acts of violence and call upon all parties to cease hostilities and engage in the search for sustainable peace, and call on Somalis to renounce violence and adhere to the Transitional Federal Charter. I particularly call on all parties to protect the civilian population and abstain from harming or kidnapping humanitarian workers and other expatriates working in Somalia. The ongoing skirmishes between “Puntland” and “Somaliland” continue to be a source of

concern. Both parties are urged to resort to peaceful means for resolving their dispute.

78. I also call on State and non-State actors to respect the arms embargo and stop the flow of arms into Somalia, which fuel the conflict not only in Somalia but also in other areas of Africa.

79. I generally endorse the three-track strategic approach, defined by the strategic assessment, as the basis for the United Nations engagement in Somalia. Robust support of the ongoing political process could lead to improved security conditions. An important measure of such improvements will be the degree to which humanitarian actors enjoy greater space and freedom of movement, to alleviate the suffering of the displaced and vulnerable. This would require sustained commitment by political forces within the country to resolve outstanding differences.

80. I am aware that the complexity and uncertainties of the present security situation, as noted by the fact-finding mission, may not encourage countries to respond to the challenging need for an international stabilization force. However, the measure of stability afforded by such a presence would enhance considerably the prospects for a successful peace process. I have therefore requested the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to remain closely engaged with Member States. I encourage those countries with the capabilities to take the initiative in the deployment of an international stabilization force to permit the withdrawal of foreign forces and prevent a vacuum thereafter. In the meantime, contingency planning for an integrated peacekeeping operation should be continually updated, so that we are prepared for deployment as soon as the conditions permit. As detailed in the fact-finding report, these conditions are regrettably not in place.

81. An increased presence of United Nations personnel on the ground would assist in supporting the parties in the political process, through the provision of impartial good offices at the local and national levels, as well as through programmatic assistance to key peacebuilding efforts related to governance and security. Increased deployment of United Nations personnel in southern and central Somalia must, however, be a gradual process, building up as security conditions permit. I have therefore instructed the Department of Political Affairs, UNPOS and the United Nations country team to work with the Department of Safety and Security in determining the activities that are critical to support the political progress and security options to ensure the protection of United Nations personnel who would need to be deployed, even if for a few days at a time, to help implement those activities.

82. In the meantime, to allow intensified and effective political and humanitarian engagement calibrated to the security conditions, I have asked the Department of Safety and Security, in consultation with the Departments of Peacekeeping Operation and Field Support to assess the feasibility of and develop credible security options to enable relocation of UNPOS and the country team headquarters from Nairobi to Mogadishu.

83. I would also like to draw the attention of the Council to the precarious human rights situation in the country. The lack of accountability, for past and current crimes, reinforces a sense of impunity and further fuels conflict. A reliable and visible human rights capacity is important for the implementation of the three-track strategic approach. I am calling for the establishment of an effective capacity within

UNPOS to monitor and enhance the protection of human rights, in the framework of previous decisions on human rights in integrated missions.

84. I commend the AMISOM troops for their professionalism in discharging their duties in a very difficult environment. I also welcome the recent arrival of troops from Burundi. As mentioned earlier, the United Nations remains committed to providing all possible support to the African Union in further strengthening AMISOM. I also commend all international partners for their efforts and commitment to help Somalia reach a lasting peace.

85. I call on Member States to favourably consider the request for voluntary contributions to the African Union financial and logistic support for AMISOM as indicated in annex I to this report. At the same time, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will continue to work with the African Union in supporting AMISOM through the provision of planners and technical advice.

86. The United Nations will continue its efforts to address humanitarian needs in the country including the delivery of assistance. I commend efforts made by France and Denmark in providing escort to humanitarian convoys. I call on all Somalis to provide unhindered access (end to roadblocks and armed attacks) to relief efforts and ensure strict compliance with international humanitarian and human rights laws.

87. I reiterate my call on all States in the region to respect Somalia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. That territorial integrity is important for long-term regional security and stability. I reiterate the need to explore measures to deal with the regional dimensions of the crisis and to find ways to address the security concerns of Somalia and of its neighbours.

88. In short, we must seize, without delay, the strategic moment, and move decisively to build the foundations for durable peace and stability in Somalia. To that end, we are developing a three-pronged integrated strategy, aligning the political, security and programmatic aspects of our work in the country. I wish to reiterate my recommendation, contained in my letter to the Security Council of 20 December 2007, to strengthen the mandate of UNPOS by providing it with the necessary resources to implement an integrated United Nations approach. I wish also to reiterate the suggestion made in the same letter that the international community should equally consider, in addition to AMISOM and a possible United Nations peacekeeping force, other options including the deployment of a robust multinational force or "coalition of willing partners" for a specific period of time with a limited objective of securing a specific area, which could pave the way for the withdrawal of foreign forces.

89. The structure of the United Nations system in Somalia needs to be reconfigured to ensure that the integrated strategy can be effectively carried out. UNPOS should be urgently provided with increased capacity and a more robust mandate. Second, a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator should be appointed once there is sufficient progress on the political and security tracks. In addition, a joint planning unit should be established in the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure coherence and proper articulation, consultation and synergies in the implementation of the integrated strategy.

90. Finally, I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, for his leadership and efforts to foster peace and reconciliation among Somalis. I call upon all the Somali parties and Member States to continue to give him their full support and cooperation in the pursuit of this goal.

Annex I

Letter dated 20 February 2008 from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to the Secretary-General

I wish to refer to your letter of 24 September 2007, which was in response to my earlier letter of 4 August 2007. You would recall that, in my correspondence, I echoed the call by the African Union Peace and Security Council, at its 105th meeting held on 18 January 2008, for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia that would take over from AMISOM and, pending such a deployment, the request for the United Nations to put in place a financial, logistical and technical support package for AMISOM, within the context of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

In this respect, I am pleased to forward herewith a document detailing the substance and form of the support package required. I am confident that the United Nations would consider this request with the urgency required, bearing in mind the many constraints facing AMISOM.

As you are aware, at its 105th meeting, the Peace and Security Council renewed the mandate of AMISOM for a further period of six months, while reiterating its call for the deployment of a United Nations operation to support the long-term reconstruction and stabilization of Somalia. Since my last letter to you, only limited progress has been made regarding the deployment of AMISOM. The first of the two battalions pledged by Burundi has been deployed, bringing in part of the much-needed reinforcement for the two Ugandan battalions that have been on the ground since March last year. Efforts are under way to secure the resources needed for the deployment of the second battalion. The Commission will intensify its efforts to speed up the deployment of AMISOM and reach its authorized strength, as well as support the reconciliation process in Somalia, based on the road map outlined in the Peace and Security Council communiqué.

Over the past months, encouraging developments have occurred on the political front, as exemplified by the appointment of a new Prime Minister, the subsequent formation of a new Government and the renewed commitment of the Somali authorities to the reconciliation process in their country. This calls for a more sustained support by the international community, including through the early deployment of a United Nations operation.

Against this background, I welcome the recently concluded visit undertaken by teams from both the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs to the AU Commission, here in Addis Ababa. The discussions held were fruitful, highlighting the key areas where useful collaboration could take place, and they form the basis on which the details of assistance being sought are based. I, therefore, look forward to an early follow-up on all the issues discussed.

I would also like to seize the opportunity to draw your attention to a specific aspect of the decision adopted by the Peace and Security Council in January 2008, relating to the arms embargo imposed on Somalia by resolution 733 (1992). The African Union has consistently supported the implementation of that resolution, mindful of its contribution to the search for lasting peace in Somalia.

In January last year, following the decision by the Peace and Security Council to authorize the deployment of AMISOM, an exemption to the arms embargo was

granted by the United Nations Security Council. It is the view of the African Union that the time has come to also grant an exemption to the Transitional Federal Government to enable it to establish all-inclusive and effective security and defence forces and foster its efforts to restore State authority. As it stands now, the arms embargo applies equally to those supporting the Transitional Federal Government, as the internationally recognized authority of Somalia, as well as to all those bent on undermining the ongoing processes. Clearly, this is not in tune with the stated commitment of the international community to strengthen the nascent Somali governance structures and their capacity to discharge their responsibilities.

It is against this background that the Peace and Security Council, in its communiqué, urged the United Nations Security Council to review the arms embargo imposed by resolution 733 (1992), in order to enable the Transitional Federal Government to establish effective and all-inclusive security and defence forces, while at the same time maintaining and strengthening the embargo against elements who are bent on undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia. The Commission stands ready to discuss with the United Nations the modalities of such an exemption and the benchmarks to be met by the Transitional Federal Government.

Finally, as we all strive to bring about lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia, I cannot but re-emphasize the appeal made by the Peace and Security Council for the United Nations Security Council to take measures against those who seek to prevent or block a peaceful political process, or those who threaten the transitional federal institutions or AMISOM by force, or take action that undermines stability in Somalia or the region, in line with its intention as stated in resolution 1772 (2007).

I should be grateful if you would bring the content of this letter to the attention of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alpha Oumar **Konaré**

Logistical, financial and technical support required from the United Nations for AMISOM

1. **General.** In response to African Union Chairperson Konaré's letter dated 4 August 2007, the United Nations Secretary-General by a letter dated 20 September 2007 had agreed to help the African Union to overcome serious financial, logistical and other constraints in deploying troops in Somalia. To this end, the United Nations had requested the African Union to provide detailed information on the kind of support needed by AMISOM. The current military and police concepts with the associated budget have already been shared with our United Nations counterparts in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support. The AMISOM 2008 budget has been calculated using United Nations reimbursement templates to attract potential troop-contributing countries from AU member States.
2. The current AMISOM mandate is based on 8,000 personnel (9 infantry battalions). With a view to enhancing the enabling capabilities of infantry units, one of the infantry battalions could be based on multi-role functions to include engineers, signals, logistics, military police and a guard company. Included in the 8,000 are a 270-strong police component and 300 integrated civilian and military staff for the Mission headquarters. The African Union believes it is now in a position to receive United Nations technical experts to develop an appropriate support package. The following note details immediate requirements that are currently not funded. It should furthermore be noted that even if funded the African Union does not have the capacity to turn the dollar figures into a resource.
3. **Phases of AMISOM operations.** The AMISOM area of operational responsibility is divided into three sectors: Sector 1, Kismaayo; Sector 2, Mogadishu; and Sector 3, Galcayo. AMISOM plans to launch all nine battalions in Sector 2 (Mogadishu) during Phase 1. After successful completion of Phase 1, AMISOM will outwardly expand for Phase 2 towards the Baidoa, Marka, Kismaayo and Galcayo Sectors simultaneously with recycled troops. It may be mentioned that with a view to providing quick relief to the civil population, police and other civil components will also be launched in Sector 2 during Phase 1.
4. **Current situation.** To date only three battalions out of the nine authorized have actually deployed with the fourth not expected to be fully deployed until the end of May. The African Union is fully aware that the present AU support arrangements are not attractive to potential future troop-contributing countries. While the African Union commends the United Nations assistance in mobilizing bilateral assistance for the troop contributions of the Ugandans and Burundians already deployed, it is far from certain that the pledging of troops from Ghana and Nigeria will materialize in the required time frame unless the Mission support package is far more robust and certain.
5. Given the host of daunting challenges that lie ahead of AMISOM to ensure the requisite security environment that allows the political process to continue, it is paramount that AMISOM be supported both in terms of personnel and of financial backing. Taking note of the Secretary-General's report on Somalia of 7 November 2007 (S/2007/658, para. 32) whereby the United Nations recognizes the above-mentioned serious financial, logistical and other constraints in deploying troops, it is essential that AU partners including the United Nations assist not only with the

funding but also with the implementation of the foreseen requirements in an effort to ensure that AMISOM can fulfil its mandate.

6. **Logistics support from the United Nations.** The areas in which the United Nations is requested to consider the provision of logistical support to AMISOM are:

(a) Procurement and project management for the construction of AMISOM mission headquarters to United Nations minimum operating safety standard criteria to allow takeover of the facility by any follow-up United Nations mission.

(b) Establishing, with essential support staff, a main logistics base in Mombasa, Djibouti or Dar es Salaam and a forward logistics base in Mogadishu to support all mission components by providing transportation, stores, equipment and the required material-handling equipment.

(c) Assisting with the procurement and provision of mission-wide long-term fuel and ration contracts to take over from current bilateral arrangement.

(d) Enhancement of voice and data communication systems to force/mission headquarters down to battalion headquarters level to include rear link with AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa.

(e) Establishment of a transit camp near Mogadishu airport with the capacity to accommodate a battalion.

(f) Provision of essential AU police component communication equipment, armoured vehicles and accommodation infrastructure.

(g) Assistance in transportation and deployment of AMISOM troops/equipment to Mogadishu from respective troop-contributing countries.

(h) Provision of one dedicated wet lease medium-sized fixed wing aircraft (Dash 8 type) for transportation of personnel within the mission area and to Nairobi.

(i) Enhancement of current AMISOM field hospital to United Nations level II standard.^a

^a The African Union is currently investigating possibility of negotiating a memorandum of understanding with UNDP Somalia/UNOPS to procure equipment enhancement.

7. **Financial support from the United Nations.** The current budget estimates total \$885,174,163. Areas where financial support that has yet to be identified from AU partners warranting support from United Nations assessed budget or through bilateral partner funding are as follows (all figures rounded up to the nearest 100,000):

Mission headquarters salaries and associated costs	23 000 000
Construction of mission headquarters	30 300 000
Mission headquarters vehicles	20 500 000
Communications	8 000 000
General supply items	5 200 000
Mission fuel ^b	68 500 000
8 infantry battalions, 1 Engineer Company, 1 Signal Company, 1 Logistics Company, 1 Military Police Company and 1 Guard Company ^c	355 400 000
Air	22 700 000
Maritime (4 Frigates, 1 Log Tender)	147 000 000
Medical	13 200 000
Police including armoured vehicles	57 500 000
Humanitarian including quick-impact projects	20 500 000
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration	22 300 000
Civil affairs and media	23 400 000
Grand total	817 500 000

8. **Technical support from the United Nations.** The present AU administration is not resourced to cope with the operational tempo required to meet peacekeeping on such a large scale. To this end, it is essential that the African Union looks into other methodologies in providing its mission support initiatives while it revises and sharpens its current procurement and financial procedures. As such, in the short term until the African Union capacities are enhanced, the African Union is looking to the United Nations for assistance in the area of mission support. Whether the finance to support AMISOM comes from the United Nations assessed budget or through partner funding, the United Nations is specifically requested to provide staff on loan in the critical areas of Chief of Mission support, procurement, budget, finance, internal audit oversight, contingent-owned equipment,^d contract management, and a security adviser to the Head of Mission. The lessons learned from the AMIS mission to Darfur must be translated into a best practice that assures accountability and transparency.

^b Current requirements currently provided through bilateral arrangements.

^c At present troop allowances, major equipment and sustainment are being provided through bilateral arrangements.

^d Only required if troop-contributing countries are self-sustained through United Nations equivalent of troop reimbursement.

Annex II

United Nations strategic assessment of Somalia

1. The Security Council in resolution 1772 (2007) mandated the Secretary-General to intensify his efforts in support of a road map for a comprehensive peace process and an end to conflict in Somalia. An Integrated Task Force on Somalia, headed by the Department of Political Affairs, was established at Headquarters in New York, and it deployed, in January 2008, a strategic assessment mission to Somalia. The mission, led by the Department of Political Affairs and supported by the Peacebuilding Support Office, comprised the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Development Programme, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Safety and Security, the United Nations Development Group Office and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and the United Nations country team.

2. Somalia is the first country in which the methodology for a strategic assessment mechanism has been applied. The strategic assessment provides the means for undertaking an integrated response to the situation in Somalia and allows senior decision makers to determine the appropriate form of United Nations engagement. It does not aim at repeating previous assessments or validating ongoing programmes, but to indicate possibilities for the United Nations to maximize coherence, focus and impact.

3. This exercise coincided with a fact-finding mission led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the region mandated by the Security Council to develop contingency plans for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation and to determine options for further support to AMISOM. The findings of that mission complement those of the strategic assessment as they provide further explanations on security options.

4. The present summary presents the main findings of the strategic assessment as contained in the full length version which was endorsed by the Integrated Task Force on Somalia on 25 February 2008.

I. Context

5. The findings of the strategic assessment are premised on the notion that, since the conclusion of the National Reconciliation Congress, a strategic moment has arrived which the international community and the Somalis themselves must seize in order to strengthen national efforts towards peace and security. Local and international factors have combined to bring about a unique opportunity, including the recent appointment of a new Cabinet under a proactive Prime Minister, which has provided a fresh impetus to the implementation of the Transitional Charter; the willingness expressed by both the Transitional Federal Government and elements of the “opposition” to engage in a political dialogue; the unanimous acceptance by the international community of United Nations leadership in the peace process, as well as its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The Security Council affirmed its willingness to support a lasting political solution and to avoid a continuation of stop-gap measures. For its part, the African Union Peace and Security Council is actively seized of Somalia.

6. These positive developments notwithstanding, there have never been so many people in Somalia in such dire humanitarian circumstances and there has never been such limited ability to support them, mainly because of precarious security conditions. The Transitional Federal Government effectively controls only a portion of the territory and key constitutional challenges such as the question of federalism have yet to be addressed. Against the historical backdrop of 14 failed peace processes, many observers remain sceptical about the immediate prospects for Somalia to emerge from protracted conflict.

7. On balance, this assessment argues that the international community must build on the current momentum and further increase its support to the peace process. These efforts need to be directed in a harmonized, coherent approach which effectively links the political strategy with a credible security response and critical programmes that contribute to ending violent conflict and laying the foundation for sustainable peace as elaborated in the United Nations transitional plan and the consolidated appeal process.

II. Dynamics of the conflict

8. The factors driving the conflict in Somalia are complex and multi-faceted. The strategic assessment has mapped out the following conflict drivers as being most critical:

- The complete collapse of the central Government and the absence of a recent tradition in good governance and the rule of law.
- The manipulation of clan conflicts and the prominence of the clan structure in most aspects of coexistence, including power-sharing.
- The impact of factional conflicts on the political process, especially where they are linked to economic interests.
- The threats posed by the security sector, including 100,000 ex-combatants and militia and a steady flow of weapons despite the United Nations arms embargo.
- The fierce competition for resources, including access to water, grazing grounds and arable land, which in turn has produced multiple layers of displacement.
- The influence exerted by neighbouring countries on Somalia, including through military engagement that supports opposing sides in the conflict.
- The global counter-terrorism strategy which has a clear impact on the dynamics of the conflict as indicated by the origins of the Transitional Federal Government and the challenges to its legitimacy.
- The lack of accountability, for past and current crimes, which reinforces a sense of impunity and fuels further fighting.
- The dire humanitarian situation which exacerbates the conflict and has generated more than 1 million internally displaced persons.

9. The United Nations needs to develop an effective response to address these factors. The box below presents five major outcomes and relates them to priority

actions to be undertaken by the United Nations. The table condenses a more comprehensive list of priority actions which are meant to guide United Nations activities in addressing the root causes of conflict.

Outcome 1: viable political process (foster and sustain structured dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government and the opposition; manage regional political, security and economic interests in support of a political process)

Outcome 2: minimum level of security (build Somali security capability; plan, prepare and deploy an international presence to stabilize conditions in support of a political process)

Outcome 3: strengthened federal institutions (accelerate capacity-building for the Transitional Federal Government/transitional federal institutions and help demonstrate progress in the transition; assist the Transitional Federal Government in facilitating economic recovery and service delivery; foster national cohesion through strengthened federal institutions)

Outcome 4: established local governance (support local reconciliation and governance institution-building, including participation of women and youth; link local governance with rule of law institutions, locally and federally; build capacity for local government, support land dispute resolution)

Outcome 5: humanitarian needs met, economic recovery and basic services provided (provide impartial humanitarian assistance; provide basic services on a recovery basis including health and education; strengthen existing and explore alternative livelihoods; involve business community in developing economy of peace)

III. Integrated strategic approach

10. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General presented to the Security Council, in December 2007, a two-track approach to achieving peace and stability in Somalia, comprising a political process to facilitate dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government and opposition elements, and the provision of a necessary level of security on the ground. However, this approach does not account for the engagement of United Nations funds, agencies and programmes under the United Nations country team, which have been extending critical support to ending conflict and building peace.

11. The central tenet of the strategic assessment is, therefore, that the political, security and programmatic dimensions (encompassing outcomes 3, 4 and 5) of the United Nations efforts must be closely linked and reinforce each other in a well-orchestrated three-track approach. The assessment presents the broad outlines of an integrated approach that can form the basis for a strategy under the leadership of the Special Representative. The mission identified several examples of how the lack of strategic direction has affected project implementation. Many previous efforts have

suffered from the lack of such a coherent strategy and a reluctance to effectively coordinate among the different United Nations components. The following paragraphs describe the broad strategic thrust of each component and suggest relevant sequencing.

12. **Political track.** The political process led by the Special Representative rests upon an affirmation by the Transitional Federal Government and the opposition that they will engage in political dialogue. Such a dialogue should lead to agreement on an agenda of items to be addressed, including the withdrawal of foreign forces and a possible review of the transitional timeline. This needs to be followed by a formal military technical agreement and a request for the deployment of an international security presence based on continued tangible progress in the political process as reflected on the ground in an improved security and humanitarian situation. The political process is expected to lead to an improvement in the security environment but it will not, by itself, be sufficient to address security needs.

13. **Security track.** A credible security presence even before a formal ceasefire agreement is reached is essential to provide minimum security to promote political dialogue. Early consideration of this option can in itself send an important signal to the Somali people and strengthen the political process, although a fully fledged peacekeeping mission can be deployed only when minimum conditions have been met. It is essential that the Security Council consider options to create an enabling environment for the political process, including working with the African Union Peace and Security Council, donors and troop-contributing countries to provide stronger support to AMISOM, the relocation of the United Nations headquarters to Mogadishu, and the deployment of a stabilization force to prevent a security vacuum following the withdrawal of foreign forces.

14. **Programmatic track.** With increased security and a possible move of UNPOS and the country team back to Somalia, there would be improvement in access, and humanitarian agencies would be able to increase their assistance. Other United Nations actors can also expand capacity-building support to the transitional federal institutions, economic recovery, and the provision of basic services and livelihoods. Step-by-step access to southern and central Somalia will allow for a more comprehensive programming effort leading to rapid improvements in the livelihoods of Somalis and the capability of the transitional federal institutions.

15. **Interlinkages.** These components cannot proceed in isolation from one another. There will be few prospects for relocation unless the political process at least commences; the United Nations cannot relocate to Mogadishu unless appropriate security arrangements, in terms of both protection elements and physical infrastructure, are in place, particularly if political mediation meetings are to be supported; nor can it extend its reach beyond Mogadishu without a significant security presence as a result of increased political will by the parties. A peacekeeping operation cannot be deployed before the political process has progressed sufficiently for the parties to reach a formal agreement to end the fighting. Thus, a comprehensive United Nations strategy to bring an end to conflict in Somalia must be based on a clear understanding of the linkages between the three components.

16. **Managing the timeline.** The assessment suggests that developments over the next 12 to 18 months should be divided into distinct phases to demonstrate that progress must be made across the board and not be limited to only one of the three

tracks. By way of illustration, whereas the first phase would broadly correspond to a continuation of current engagements, the United Nations should proceed to move into the second phase after the following benchmarks are broadly met: at least 60 to 70 per cent of the opposition are backing a political dialogue (political track); conditions for a relocation of the United Nations to Somalia are considered viable (security track) and the transitional federal institutions, including the Government, are able to perform basic functions in Mogadishu (programmatic track). The strategic assessment introduces these benchmarks for four distinct phases, leading up to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in the fourth phase. Without being prescriptive, the approach would allow the United Nations to gauge whether conditions are conducive for an advance into the next stage.

IV. Conclusions and recommendations

17. The overarching strategic goal of the United Nations in Somalia is to help to improve the lives of Somalis by ending violent conflict and laying the foundations for sustainable peace. This goal anchors the integrated strategic approach and organizes United Nations capacities accordingly. The following recommendations are presented to ensure the viability of the integrated approach:

18. **Integration of the three tracks.** The structure of the United Nations system in Somalia requires a reconfiguration to ensure that the three strategic components (political, security and programmatic) can be effectively supported; one option, which is supported by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, would be to appoint the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General once there is sufficient progress on the political and security tracks. A joint planning unit should also be established within the office of the Special Representative for the common and coherent implementation of an integrated strategy. Members of the country team should second staff to the joint planning cell and accept the political lead of UNPOS.

19. **Strengthened UNPOS capacity.** To fulfil its leadership function and to forge linkages with the United Nations country team, UNPOS will need to be urgently provided with a significantly increased capacity. A review of the UNPOS mandate to reflect its coordinating role would also need to be considered. Such a role would include guiding, integrating and advising other United Nations actors in a consultative manner to ensure that the various roles are mutually reinforcing and contribute to the overall United Nations goal. The role of UNPOS would include ongoing assessment and management of the United Nations strategic environment in Somalia, with the country team retaining its role in programme implementation.

20. **Strengthened capacity of the United Nations country team.** To effectively contribute to the integrated strategy, the United Nations country team requires the ability to respond to opportunities as they arise and link initiatives with other tracks. This requires more flexible funding mechanisms. Members of the country team should be seconded to the joint planning cell under the leadership of UNPOS.

21. **Viable security component.** Credible security options are indispensable to (a) facilitating the relocation of United Nations headquarters to Mogadishu and other parts of southern and central Somalia; (b) allowing the withdrawal of foreign forces, thus enhancing the political process, and preventing a security vacuum; and (c) maintaining peace and building Somali security capability. While the

deployment of a peacekeeping operation may not be immediately feasible, there is significant scope for the consideration of other security arrangements to promote the political process and support the implementation of programmes.

22. **Coordination platform.** The Special Representative of the Secretary-General needs to establish a mechanism linking the United Nations, international partners of Somalia and Somali authorities, to ensure inclusiveness and effectiveness.

23. **Relocation into Somalia.** Despite the prevailing security constraints, a relocation of United Nations headquarters to Somalia is an essential prerequisite for the integrated approach as it will create space for the political process, enhance the delivery capacity of the United Nations and build its credibility in the eyes of Somalis. While the current situation may allow for only a limited presence in Mogadishu, United Nations offices could be moved from Nairobi to other locations inside Somalia as conditions permit. Once there is measured improvement in the political process, with 60 to 70 per cent of the opposition supporting political dialogue, UNPOS should relocate to Mogadishu.

24. **Common communication and outreach strategy.** Coherence in public communications addressed to both Somali and international audiences is an essential ingredient in reinforcing an integrated United Nations strategy and concerted efforts are required in this regard.

25. **United Nations human rights capacity.** The United Nations has to be able to monitor and report on alleged abuses and human rights violations, and has to be equipped for human rights training and advocacy on the local and central level.

Annex III

Contingency plans for a possible United Nations peacekeeping operation

1. In examining possibilities for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia, the fact-finding team undertook a thorough analysis of the security situation, including threats and risks to the security of United Nations personnel. It is important to note that the situation is not the same throughout the country. Conditions in the north are relatively better than in southern and central Somalia. In those areas, the conflict remains extremely complex, characterized by a web of shifting alliances between clans, subclans, and extremist elements, fighting for control of political and economic space, and a temporary alliance of some groups, aimed at forcing the withdrawal of Ethiopian armed forces from the country. As the Government has little capacity to regulate the economy and ensure law and order, criminal elements are free to seek influence over revenue collection, customs, the port, trade, water and land, and engage in the trafficking of arms and drugs and in human trafficking. Inter- and intra-clan tensions over political power and economic resources cannot always be related directly to the activities of criminal and insurgent elements, but cannot be separated from them.

2. The continuing threat of abduction, kidnapping and extortion limits the capacity of United Nations and humanitarian agencies to operate within the country. At the same time, the United Nations country team estimates that the population in need of humanitarian aid is now approaching 2 million people in what my Special Representative has stated is the worst humanitarian crisis in Africa today.

Northern Somalia: “Somaliland” and “Puntland”

3. Security in the north of Somalia remains fragile, but the situation there is relatively better than in southern and central Somalia. The fact-finding mission attempted to visit Hargeysa in “Somaliland” but was prevented from doing so by security concerns caused by a political rally. “Somaliland” and “Puntland” continue to dispute their border in the Sool and Sanag regions, centred on the city of Laascaanood. This issue is related to the administrative border that allocates the region to Somaliland, although the people who live in the area belong to the Darod-Dolbohanta clan of “Puntland”. The state identity of these two lands will require careful consideration in any future Somali federation. Although “Somaliland” has officially indicated its desire to secede from Somalia, no country has recognized it as a separate State. The self-declared autonomous State of “Puntland” has stated its desire to remain a part of Somalia as an autonomous region, but it has significant security problems, including piracy and kidnapping, as well as the border dispute with “Somaliland”.

Southern and central Somalia

4. Since June 2007, combatants of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and other elements, collectively known as anti-Government elements, have conducted almost daily insurgency operations against Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government forces, particularly in Mogadishu. Hostilities over the past year have included targeted assassinations, hand and rocket-propelled grenade attacks, mortar attacks, small arms clashes, roadside bombs and the use of landmines. While some areas of

Mogadishu are the epicentre of violence, there have also been attacks in Kismaayo, Jawhar, Beledweyne, Baidoa and Galkayo in southern and central Somalia. In those regions the targets of the attacks generally have been Ethiopian armed forces, Government troops, police and police stations; and Government authorities. Some 12 District Commissioners have been assassinated since August 2007. Although suicide attacks have been rare in Somalia, the United Nations country team statistics indicate that seven body-borne and vehicular suicide attacks targeted Ethiopian troops and Government officials from April to October 2007.

5. Until ousted by the Ethiopian armed forces late in 2006/early in 2007, the Union of Islamic Courts maintained influence over a good portion of southern Somalia extending from the Mudug region in the north to the Lower Juba region. The only regions in south-central Somalia not controlled by UIC in December 2006 were parts of the Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions. Some elements of the UIC leadership have indicated their willingness to engage in discussions on an inclusive political agreement, while more extremist elements such as Al-Shabaab are alleged to have terrorist associations and have expressed the intention of overthrowing the Transitional Federal Government and expelling the Ethiopian forces from Somalia. The stronghold of UIC extremist elements is reported to be in the Hiraan and Juba districts, where they allegedly run training camps. Reports have indicated that international terrorists have sought safe haven in these areas of Somalia. While some reports indicate that extremist Al-Shabaab elements may have links to international terrorist cells, those reports cannot be verified and it should be noted that Al-Shabaab elements appear to be focusing their insurgent operations against the Ethiopian armed forces and the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu, rather than other targets outside of Somalia.

6. The fact-finding team was the first United Nations mission to visit Kismaayo since the fighting began in mid-2006. While the city was free of fighting on the day the team visited, the situation in the city remains volatile, particularly because of fighting for control over the port and airport. Although the team met with Government officials representing an alliance of clans who claim to control most of "Jubaland", it was clear to the team that the security situation is fluid and far from stable. More recently, a Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) vehicle was hit by an improvised explosive device on the road between the city and the airport, killing two international and one national staff member, leading MSF to temporarily withdraw its international staff from its operations in southern Somalia. The fact-finding mission also visited Baidoa and the port of Marka, where the situation is assessed to be more stable although underlying tensions remain.

Situation in Mogadishu

7. The fact-finding team spent three days and two nights in Mogadishu, meeting officials and travelling in United Nations civilian armoured vehicles to many districts to assess the security situation in the city. Hostilities seem to be generally confined to five districts, including Yaqshid, Wardhigley, Hawl-Wadag, Hodan and Bondhere. While a number of districts were deserted, as an estimated 60 per cent of the population has temporarily fled the city, several other districts that were assessed to be safe at the time of the visit were seen to be populated: stores were open, transport was moving and the port was active.

8. The three days of relative calm experienced by the team belie the volatility of the security situation. Before the team arrived, there was serious fighting in Mogadishu that killed more than 30 people and wounded 60. In the days after the team departed, fighting once again broke out. Mortars were fired at the airport, where the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is based, one mortar exploding close to the United Nations common compound. Those attacks coincided with the completion of the Burundian battalion's deployment to AMISOM and illustrate how quickly the security situation can change.

9. The Department of Safety and Security has undertaken a trend analysis of the types of attacks against certain targets throughout Somalia, including Mogadishu, in 2007. The general security trend in Mogadishu appears proportional to the level of military effort undertaken by the coalition of Ethiopian armed forces and Transitional Federal Government troops to defeat the anti-Government elements or conduct forcible disarmament. From June to September 2007, there was a sharp increase in standoff attacks, improvised explosive device incidents, mine attacks and assassinations but a marked decrease in armed clashes. During this period, it was assessed that the more radical anti-Government elements were active, while the remainder were awaiting the outcome of the National Reconciliation Congress and the decision of the Transitional Federal Government to carry out the recommendations of the Congress. Since September, actions of the Ethiopian and Government forces have increased, with a concerted effort to eradicate the radical anti-Government elements within Mogadishu. Reported retaliatory fire by the Ethiopian armed forces, using field guns and heavy mortars against the anti-Government elements in heavily populated civilian areas, has caused significant loss of life and damage to civilian property. Moreover, it prompted the mass evacuation of civilians from Mogadishu in November, creating thousands of internally displaced persons. It is noteworthy that during the last quarter of 2007 attacks by the anti-Government elements have become more coordinated and have begun to be conducted during daylight hours.

10. The African Union Mission in Somalia has occasionally been targeted, notably by explosive device and mortar attacks when it first arrived and more recently with mortar and grenade attacks. The United Nations has also been targeted, and one national staff member was abducted in Kismaayo. In Mogadishu, a National Coordinator of the World Food Programme was detained when the United Nations common compound was forcibly entered on 17 October 2007. On 8 and 9 February 2008, the United Nations common compound, where the team had stayed, was targeted by hand grenade and improvised explosive device attacks. Threats against the United Nations have also appeared on Islamist websites.

11. In summary, while the Transitional Federal Government has made some progress in building an inclusive and viable peace process by reaching out to opposition groups, the security situation in many parts of Somalia remains volatile and unpredictable. This is particularly the case in Mogadishu where there are security incidents almost daily, mostly carried out by insurgents targeting Government military and police, as well as Ethiopian and AMISOM military personnel. Owing to the complex nature of the conflict, which is influenced by shifting alliances and extremist elements, the situation in southern and central Somalia can change daily, making any location that is safe one day potentially dangerous the next.

Contingency planning for a United Nations integrated peacekeeping mission in Somalia

Scenarios

12. Possible future developments are presented under four scenarios, leading up to the deployment of a possible United Nations peacekeeping operation.

13. **Scenario 1.** This scenario generally represents the current situation in Somalia. The Transitional Federal Government, with the support of national and international partners, continues to work on the development of an inclusive and viable political process, including initiating dialogue. Meanwhile, the security situation remains volatile. Ethiopian and Government forces continue to battle armed opposition in the central districts of Mogadishu and UIC and extremist opposition elements continue to extend their influence in certain regions in southern Somalia where they maintain training camps. While AMISOM may receive additional troops, it is unlikely to reach a size that could provide security in Mogadishu and allow for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. The Transitional Federal Government, for its part, is also unable to maintain security in Mogadishu or to extend its authority and control throughout southern and central Somalia.

14. **Scenario 2.** This scenario envisages a measured improvement in the political process, with at least 60 to 70 per cent of the opposition supporting political dialogue. While the security situation may still be volatile, dialogue on security arrangements has commenced. These conditions would create the conditions necessary for strengthening the United Nations presence in Mogadishu and other areas of southern and central Somalia.

15. **Scenario 3.** This scenario envisages a measured improvement in the political and security situation. The major clans and factions, including 60 to 70 per cent of the armed opposition groups, would accept and implement a code of conduct on the use of arms. While this may be short of a full security agreement, it would establish a minimum code of behaviour among the armed groups. At the same time, the Government of Ethiopia and the Transitional Federal Government would have indicated readiness to consider the staged withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Mogadishu.

16. **Scenario 4.** In this scenario, a viable political process would have taken hold in southern and central Somalia and "Puntland" with the majority (70 per cent) of the parties agreeing to a political power-sharing agreement and to renounce violence, lay down arms and commit themselves to supporting the implementation of a Security Council mandate establishing an integrated United Nations peacekeeping operation. It may be foreseen that spoilers would remain, but they would have been marginalized to the extent possible. Under this scenario, the Ethiopian forces would have withdrawn or would be in the process of doing so. A military technical agreement in support of peace would have been signed by the major clans and factions, which would list security arrangements, such as certain ways to achieve disarmament, in respect of heavy weapons as a minimum, and non-violent settlement of disputes.

Contingency plans

17. On the basis of the findings and scenarios set out above, the Secretariat has further developed contingency plans for support that could be provided by the international community to the peace process in Somalia. Under the first two scenarios, the intent would be to enhance United Nations political and programmatic (humanitarian, recovery and development) support to Somalia. Under the third scenario, the objective would be to enhance security in Mogadishu, following the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces. Under the fourth scenario, the Security Council might wish to consider the establishment of an integrated United Nations peacekeeping operation for Somalia, based on broad political and security agreements between major stakeholders.

Scenario 1 contingency plans

18. While the United Nations country team is present in a number of areas of Somalia, the current security situation does not allow for further deployment of UNPOS and country team personnel in Mogadishu and the southern and central parts of the country. As a result, these personnel are stationed in Nairobi, visiting Somalia usually for a few hours or days at a time, as security conditions permit. I have requested the Department of Safety and Security, in consultation with the designated official, to develop viable options to relocate UNPOS and country team personnel from Nairobi to Mogadishu and other parts of southern and central Somalia. The relocation would support United Nations political efforts and address critical gaps in humanitarian and recovery assistance.

19. Another measure under the present security scenario which could be considered by the Security Council is the establishment of a maritime task force, formalizing the unilateral initiatives currently being undertaken by individual Member States, either as a United Nations task force or as an international task force under a United Nations mandate. Subject to the scale of the task force, its mission could be limited to the protection of United Nations, humanitarian and AMISOM supply shipping or expanded to deter piracy and support the international arms embargo established under resolution 733 (1992), within capabilities and its assigned area of operations. In the absence of a secure environment in Mogadishu, this contingency could also provide medical, logistic and in extremis support for United Nations personnel in Somalia. An expert assessment of the maritime assets needed to deliver the extended maritime mission would be required but an initial estimate suggests a requirement of up to four corvettes or frigates, with helicopters.

Scenario 2 contingency plans

20. The objective under this contingency would be for the United Nations to further enhance its political support to the peace process, through the relocation of UNPOS headquarters to Mogadishu in order to facilitate political dialogue on the ground. The establishment of a larger United Nations presence on land within Somalia even in a measurably improved political atmosphere would require the development of appropriate security arrangements, both in terms of protection elements and physical infrastructure. The development of these arrangements would require further detailed work to define the number of UNPOS and country team personnel required in Somalia, their activities and consequent protection requirement. Subject to the scale of the required presence, these arrangements could

take considerable time to put in place and entail a major investment in resources and physical protection measures. This further assessment should be undertaken as soon as possible by the Department of Safety and Security, in close consultation with the Department of Political Affairs, UNPOS, the country team and the Departments of Field Support and Peacekeeping Operations.

Scenario 3 contingency plans

21. Under scenario 3, it is assumed that the political dialogue between the Government and the opposition would have commenced. Although the Government of Ethiopia has maintained that it wishes to withdraw its troops from Somalia, it has indicated that a withdrawal without a credible force to replace them would create a security vacuum. If the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops is to be achieved under this scenario, that is, before political and security agreements have been finalized, an impartial stabilization force of perhaps 8,000 highly trained and capable troops, together with police officers, would be required. This would require acceptance and cooperation on the part of Somali armed groups.

22. However, it should be noted that, in the absence of a broad-based political agreement, including an agreement to lay down arms, it is highly likely that if the Ethiopian armed forces were to withdraw the common focus of the Somali insurgency would be removed, and that after a short period Somali elements would revert to their traditional struggle for power and resources through the use of violence. The Somalis could also unite against this new foreign force, particularly if the stabilization force becomes embroiled in Somali rivalries. It is also foreseen that insurgent attacks could increase in other areas if deterred by the stabilization force in the capital.

23. Troops forming this stabilization force would have to be well trained in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist techniques. They would primarily conduct foot patrols in Mogadishu to dominate the area of operations in such a manner as to reassure, rather than alienate, the population. The troops would need to be trained to respond robustly with armed force to attacks against them but by applying force precisely, using the minimum force necessary and avoiding collateral damage. Civilians are almost invariably killed or injured when excessive force, including the use of artillery or mortars, is used in urban environments. While the stabilization force could begin to win the support of the people through the provision of effective security, it would only win their hearts and minds by making a real difference to their lives, by facilitating aid and development.

24. The stabilization force would require timely and accurate intelligence on extremist and other groups. The force would also need strong physical protection at its bases. Buildings would require additional floors or roofs to protect against mortars, as well as screens on the walls to defeat rocket-propelled grenade attacks; and personnel would need bunkers where they could take cover, if under mortar attack. Troops would need to apply tactical techniques to minimize their vulnerability to roadside bombs and should possess electronic countermeasures to defeat radio-controlled explosive devices such as those used by extremist groups, and explosive ordnance disposal teams for safe disposal.

25. A United Nations force could not be tasked with this role. Previous experience in the United Nations Operation in Somalia in 1993 revealed that United Nations military actions can undermine other United Nations political and humanitarian

initiatives. If the United Nations is seeking to facilitate peace negotiations between the Somali parties, its impartiality is undermined by fighting with one or more of those parties. In addition, the vast majority of United Nations peacekeeping troops do not possess the capabilities or training that is detailed above. The employment of ill-trained and ill-equipped troops in such a force would be likely to result in failure, which would be disastrous for Somalia, as well as for peacekeeping efforts worldwide.

26. As a result, the Security Council could consider this option only if offers were forthcoming from capable Member States ready to form a coalition of the willing, under a strong lead country. It is assumed that AMISOM will not receive the troops necessary to expand beyond some 4,000 troops. The combined coalition “stabilization” force and AMISOM could allow the withdrawal of the Ethiopian armed forces from Mogadishu. This option could allow a more rapid deployment, subject to the political will of countries concerned, and a measured escalation of foreign stabilization forces into Mogadishu, so that they would not appear to be a large invasion force. This option would also be less likely to hinder the United Nations peacebuilding and programmatic efforts in the country. Subject to the arrangements agreed between the coalition and AMISOM, the combined stabilization force would be likely to have complex command and control, financial and logistic arrangements that could undermine its overall capability. If the force did not have the required capabilities, it would not be able to deter or meet threats against it, thus possibly aggravating, rather than stabilizing, the situation.

Scenario 4 contingency plans

27. In my previous reports to the Security Council on the deployment of an integrated United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia, I noted a number of conditions that would be required to ensure the best chances of success of the mission. They included a viable and inclusive political process and an agreement on the cessation of hostilities. The strategic assessment and fact-finding missions have further reviewed and refined these conditions with their counterparts on the ground, developing proposals for graduated interlinked political, security and programmatic assistance aimed at achieving an inclusive and stable political and peacebuilding process in Somalia.

28. Sustainable long-term peace in Somalia will require at a minimum a political dispensation acceptable to the majority of stakeholders, the development of security, judicial and corrections institutions capable of ensuring the rule of law, and the administrative and institutional capacity necessary to provide basic and social services to the population. The United Nations stands ready to assist, including through the deployment at the appropriate time of an integrated peacekeeping operation. In the meantime, my Special Representative continues to work with all concerned towards the political and power-sharing agreements and security commitments that would be necessary for such an operation to succeed.

29. Given the nature of the conflict, such an agreement should provide general provisions on political power-sharing, legalization of the economy, laying-down of arms and monitoring of heavy weapons, respect for human rights, facilitation of humanitarian assistance, and development of governing institutions at the central and local levels. In regard to the security aspects, the majority of the parties should state their agreement to the deployment of an integrated United Nations

peacekeeping operation and commitment to support the implementation of its mandate. Although such an agreement is unlikely to include the radical groups, it could provide the catalyst for commencing security negotiations with the parties on starting disarmament and removing the most dangerous weapons from the hands of moderate groups. While a typical ceasefire agreement may not be appropriate for the circumstances that prevail in Somalia, some form of technical military agreement, signed by all major clans and subclans, would be essential to underpin an integrated peacekeeping operation. It should at a minimum contain a declaration on cessation of hostilities and provisions for the control of heavy weapons, carriage of small arms and combating acts of terrorism.

30. In the light of the above, the fact-finding mission also focused its attention on contingencies to assist in creating security conditions conducive to negotiations towards such agreements. These contingencies take into account the assessment that, in the absence of broadly inclusive political and security agreements, a number of groups will continue to use violence to pursue their political and economic agendas, including against the United Nations and international peacekeepers.

31. At the same time, the international community continues to assist, establish and train Somali security forces to assume responsibility for the security of the country. Ethiopia and Rwanda have trained over 1,000 Somali military. Other friends of Somalia, such as Kenya and Uganda, are providing police training. While this training support and that provided by the European Union are welcome as an interim measure, a coherent and long-term approach is required to support a Somali solution to the provision of national security forces that are representative of all parties. The United Nations stands ready to assist Somalia, in close coordination with other partners, in assessing the full breadth of requirements and in coordinating and providing assistance in policy, planning and capacity-building requirements for the full spectrum of security sector development.

32. The Secretariat is in the process of updating its contingency plan for a possible integrated United Nations peacekeeping operation to succeed AMISOM, under scenario 4. It is assumed that broad-based political and security agreements are in place to allow the deployment of the operation, subject to the Council's decision. The operation would have a strong political mandate to use its good offices in facilitating the implementation of agreements reached by the Somali parties and for reconciliation activities at the national and local levels. It would also have a strong rule of law component to assist in security sector development, including the military, police, judicial and corrections sectors. It would provide assistance for disarmament, demobilization and integration, as well as arms collection and monitoring. It would also have a strong human rights monitoring and capacity-building component, and provide assistance as required in governance and administrative capacity-building.

33. The military contingency plan is being revised in the light of the team's visits to key towns in southern and central Somalia, such as the number and composition of troops required in Marka and Kismaayo. The force required for an integrated peacekeeping mission to Somalia envisages five to six brigade-sized groups deployed in sector locations in south-central Somalia. With its headquarters in the vicinity of Mogadishu, the force would be supported by military aviation, including attack helicopters, and considerable military engineering, logistics and transport assets. The force would need to be robust and mobile with electronic

countermeasures to block radio-controlled explosive devices. Within cities, the force would operate on foot in built-up areas to reassure the public of its peaceful intent, supported by good operational information and aerial observation. However, each city sector would be supported by a robust, mechanized quick reaction force with attack aviation to provide assistance to the ground patrols when needed. This concept differs from the initial force in that the total number of armoured personnel carriers is markedly reduced, in favour of smaller armoured vehicles for use in the urban areas.

34. The force would require a reserve of one mechanized battalion initially located outside Mogadishu which could be embarked on a landing ship and moved quickly to any location on the Somali coast. Furthermore, provision would need to be made for a rapidly deployable capacity, over the horizon, to be activated in extremis, if the peace process were to unravel, particularly during the generation and deployment of the force. After 17 years of conflict, the force would require a strong mine action presence to deal with landmines and explosive remnants of war. The threat posed by improvised explosive devices could also be significant given the historical frequency of their use and the abundance of suitable component munitions available for their manufacture. A strong military explosive ordnance disposal unit would be needed to mitigate this threat, which would be distinct from the wider humanitarian mine action capability.

35. If not already deployed, a maritime task force would be required to support the arms embargo, conduct anti-piracy operations and protect supply shipping. United Nations military liaison officers would be deployed to “Somaliland” and “Puntland” to maintain close liaison with the United Nations police that would also form part of the mission and other United Nations offices; to the African Union to facilitate a transition from AMISOM; and to Kenya and Ethiopia to maintain liaison with the military authorities in those countries.

36. The total force would initially consist of 15 infantry battalions, excluding the over the horizon capacity. Depending on the stability of two of the sectors and the internally displaced civil population at the time of deployment, the final number could rise to 21 infantry battalions. The total number of United Nations military could number up to 27,000, with a possible police component of up to 1,500 police officers, including formed police units. Prior to the deployment of any United Nations mission, an integrated mission planning process must be completed, including a comprehensive technical assessment mission into Somalia. The Secretariat would also continue to monitor the situation in the north between “Somaliland” and “Puntland”, with a view to updating contingency plans accordingly.

Threats to a United Nations peacekeeping operation

37. The threat of attack on a United Nations peacekeeping operation or political presence will be proportionately mitigated by the degree to which the Somali stakeholders can build an inclusive political and economic power-sharing agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, even if United Nations personnel are not initially targeted, the situation could change very quickly if the United Nations were to be perceived as upsetting the local balance of power.

38. It is likely that spoilers will include the most extremist elements, as well as some disaffected clan and criminal elements. While a significant number of attacks

have been characterized by the use of terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures (suicide attack and the use of various types of improvised explosive devices), the use of known insurgent tactics (ambushes, indirect fire) is a growing trend. These elements use mortars that are easy to carry, quick to set up and fire before vacating the firing point, making any efforts to locate them very difficult. They use small arms, medium machine guns mounted on pick-up trucks, grenade attacks, remotely controlled roadside bombs, mines and targeted assassinations against a wide range of targets. The arms embargo monitoring groups suggest that those groups have access to surface-to-air missiles, although their use is not widespread. Any military force deploying to Somalia will require protection from those weapons, using civilian or military armoured vehicles, electronic countermeasures to interrupt the radio signal that initiates the roadside bombs, significant explosive ordnance disposal capabilities, air reconnaissance assets, well-equipped medical facilities and a robust quick reaction force to extricate force elements if required. The weaker the political agreement and commitment of Somali stakeholders to respect its mandate, the greater the capabilities the United Nations peacekeeping operation will have to include. Indeed, any United Nations force must be structured for the worst case situation: because the security situation in Somalia can change very rapidly, the force may find itself in a peaceful situation one day and in serious conflict the next.

39. The threat of criminal activity will be ever present in Somalia until the national law and order apparatus is capable of addressing it. The risk of abduction and kidnapping for ransom is likely to remain high in the north, while illegal checkpoints and extortion will remain prevalent in the south. The United Nations is likely to experience carjacking, theft and possible abduction of unprotected personnel operating independently throughout Somalia. To minimize the risk of these criminal activities, United Nations installations, convoys and personnel will require armed protection, as well as a high readiness quick reaction and investigative capacity.

Logistic considerations

40. With regard to logistics, an integrated United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia may have to be entirely supported by “out of area” sourcing of goods and services. Engagement of local contractors will have to be carefully balanced between complex national interest groups. While there is an abundance of unskilled and some skilled manpower in the country, recruitment of national staff by the United Nations may pose a challenge because of the requirement to balance employment between the interest groups.

41. Owing to the relative high level of insecurity compared to other missions it will be extremely difficult to attract international staff and contractors to deploy to Somalia unless they are relatively satisfied with attractive conditions of service including a financial incentive. Until such time as the military component is able to stabilize and improve the security situation, the number of civilians in the mission area should be kept to the minimum, to reduce risk and exposure. Insertion of civilians into the mission area will have to be controlled and will require careful planning.

42. The integrated United Nations peacekeeping operation if deployed may have to depend heavily on the use of military enabling units for a considerable period of time after the initial start-up. Generation of the military enabling units could pose a

real challenge, considering that few troop contributors may be willing to commit their troops to Somalia under the current security situation.

43. An elaborate United Nations facility, in the form of a logistics base, will need to be established in a secure environment outside the country at either Mombasa or Dar es Salaam to ensure an uninterrupted supply of materials and services independent of local sources in Somalia. The main supply line will be based on the coastal maritime route from the logistics base to Kismaayo, Mogadishu and Hobyo and, if required, at Boosaaso, which will serve as secondary logistics bases inside Somalia. From these secondary logistics bases, forward air links will be established to all deployment locations in the interior; where feasible, and security permits, land routes will be used.

Support to the African Union Mission in Somalia

44. AMISOM currently consists of approximately 2,300 troops from Uganda and Burundi. The main part of the force is deployed at the airport, with one company each at the seaport and the tactically important road junction at Km 4. The newly arrived Burundian battalion has quickly moved to a new location on the south-western side of Mogadishu.

45. The fact-finding mission met with African Union colleagues in Addis Ababa, who are responsible for the provision of the planning, management and direction of AMISOM. It also held discussions with AMISOM donors. A number of interlocutors felt that the voluntary basis of AMISOM budgetary support, and the current threats in Somalia, were the underlying reasons for the low level of pledges for AMISOM and the slow deployment.
